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RESPONSE
WHETHER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
SHOULD BE CONCEIVED AS A PERPETUAL INDEX
CODE: BLINDNESS IS WORSE THAN MYOPIA
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED*

At the outset, I want to make clear that I have enormous respect for Professor Weissenberger. We are not only colleagues;
we are also coauthors.1 We agree on many, if not most, evidentiary issues.2 Even coauthors, however, sometimes disagree. Professor Weissenberger's article refers to Professor Summers,' the
coauthor of the leading text on the Uniform Commercial Code.4
As a professor of Contracts, I frequently consult that text. One
of the most noteworthy features of the text is that the authors
openly express their disagreements in black and white.5 Following the example of those distinguished authors, Professor
Weissenberger and I are openly expressing our disagreement

* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; BA, 1967, J.D., 1969, University of San Francisco.
1. See EDWARD J. IIMRWINKELRIED & GLEN WEISSENBERGER, AN EVIDENCE ANTHOLOGY
(1996).
2. Professor Weissenberger and I concur in the observation that, in the future,
the U.S. Supreme Court should rest opinions regarding evidentiary privileges on the
concept of personal autonomy rather than the instrumental rationale that it has
used in the past. Compare Glen Weissenberger, The Psychotherapist Privilege and
the Supreme Court's Misplaced Reliance on State Legislatures, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 999
(1998), with Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Rivalry Between Truth and Privilege: The
Weakness of the Supreme Court's Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518
U.S. 1 (1996), 49 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1999).
3. See Glen Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia. The Failure to See the Federal
Rules of Evidence as a Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1539, 1582 (1999).
4. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (4th ed.

1995).
5. See id. § 1-3, at 10-12.
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over the question of the basic conception of the Federal Rules of
Evidence ("Federal Rules" or "Rules") as a statute.
Professor Weissenberger accurately restates my general position.6 In most of the cases construing the Federal Rules of Evidence, a majority of the justices have adopted a moderate
textualist approach. On the one hand, the justices have rejected
a strict textualist approach that would allow a judge to consider
extrinsic legislative history material only if the judge cannot
discern a "plain meaning" on the face of the statute.7 Instead,
the justices routinely consider extrinsic material such as the
Advisory Committee Notes and relevant congressional committee
reports.8 On the other hand, a majority of the justices also have
abandoned the traditional "legal process" approach to statutory
construction. Under that approach, a judge should not only consider the extrinsic material; more importantly, he or she should
attach great weight to the material. The legal process approach
often yields the conclusion that an intent expressed only in the
extrinsic material trumps any apparent plain meaning of the
statutory text.9 In contrast, textualists assign great primacy to
the specific language of the statute. They argue that the text is
"all that Congress enacts into 'law" 10 and that the extrinsic
material is subject to manipulation by special interest groups.'
Moderate textualists thus recognize a strong, albeit rebuttable,
presumption that the text prevails over any contrary meaning
suggested by the extrinsic material."2 3 I have written in defense
of this brand of moderate textualism.1
Even more to the point, Professor Weissenberger also correctly
states my view on the pivotal question of whether the federal

6. See Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1543.

7. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's Approach
to the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REV. 267, 269-70
(1993).
8. See Lever Bros. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1332-36 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
Imwinkehried, supra note 7, at 270.

9. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 628
(1990).
10. Id. at 648.
11. See Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today,

105 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1015-17 (1992).
12. See Gang v. United States, 783 F. Supp. 376, 380 (N.D. 111. 1992).
13. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 7.
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courts are free to expand upon the text of the Federal Rules by
enforcing exclusionary rules that are not codified in the statutory text. 14 As he notes, I have argued that the enactment of the
Federal Rules deprived the federal appellate courts of the power
to enforce categorical exclusionary rules when the text of the
Rules does not include any language that reasonably could bear
that interpretation. 5 In my view, the text of the Federal Rules is
especially pertinent to this question-ih particular, the text of
Rule 402. The defining characteristic of an exclusionary rule of
evidence is that it can operate to bar the admission of logically
relevant evidence. Rule 402 purports to list the sources of law
upon which a federal court can draw to justify the exclusion of
logically relevant evidence. In pertinent part, Rule 402 reads:
"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress,
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority."16 Although the exceptive
clause in Rule 402 lists four different types of law upon which
an appellate court may draw to rationalize the exclusion of relevant evidence, case or decisional law is conspicuously absent
from the list. The wording of Rule 402 and my reading of the
history of the Federal Rules lead me to conclude that federal
appellate courts no longer possess the common-law power to prescribe exclusionary rules in addition to those enunciated in the
text of the Federal Rules.
In contrast, Professor Weissenberger believes that the federal
appellate courts retain the common-law power to apply
17
exclusionary rules that have not been reduced to statutory text. '
He characterizes the Federal Rules as a "perpetual index code""8
that compiles the common-law exclusionary rules 9 but allows

14. See Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1553-54, 1572.
15. Even Justice Roger Traynor believed that the process of interpretation had to
be limited to meanings "to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d
641, 644 (Cal. 1968).
16. FED. R. EvID. 402.
17. See Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1550-51, 1563, 1566.
18. See . at 1559-62.
19. See id. at 1561.
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the federal appellate courts to go beyond the compilation and expand the list of exclusionary rules.2" Professor Weissenberger
advances an historical as well as a textual argument to support
this characterization. At several points, he asserts that as a
matter of historical fact, the judiciary "dominated" the process of
promulgating the Federal Rules.21 He concludes, therefore, that
in interpreting the Rules, courts should not be unduly influenced
by separation of powers concerns22 or unnecessarily defer to legislative supremacy. 23 Further, he contends that the text of Rule
102 "commands" that the Federal Rules be treated as a perpetual index code. 4
Professor Weissenberger's discussion of the various types of
codes-fully comprehensive, field comprehensive, meta-scheme,
and perpetual index 2 5 -is illuminating. To restate my position in
Professor Weissenberger's terminology, it would be fair to say
that I have argued that, with the exception of certain windows
to the common law found within Rules 30126 and 501,27 the Federal Rules constitute a field comprehensive code, regulating a
particular body of doctrine-evidence law. Further, he is probably correct in identifying the consequences that would flow if the
Federal Rules were classified as a perpetual index code. The
critical question, however, is whether the history or the text of
the Federal Rules justifies classifying the Rules in that fashion.
The rub for Professor Weissenberger is that on close scrutiny,
neither the history nor the text supports that classification.

20. See id. at 1551, 1563, 1566.
21. See id. at 1547, 1574.

22. See id. at 1547-48.
23. See id. at 1547-48, 1590.
24. See id. at 1552, 1566.
25. See id. at 1559-60.

26. See FED. R. EVID. 301 (prescribing certain limitations on the presumption and
inference doctrine but, by default, allowing the courts to employ common-law methodology to fill the gaps in that body of doctrine).
2.7. FED. R. EvID. 501 (empowering the courts to continue to use common-law
methodology to evolve privilege doctrine). But see 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAm, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 5422, 5425 (1980) (pointing
out that although the statute refers to the common law, the courts' common-law
power is no longer intact, because the courts are now exercising a delegated legislative power).
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THE HISTORY OF THE PROMULGATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES
As Professor Weissenberger chronicles the promulgation of the
Federal Rules, the process was largely a judicial one in which
Congress played only a minor role. There is certainly a temporal
element of truth in that characterization: the Judicial Conference invested well over a decade studying the question of a uniform set of evidentiary rules for federal courts while Congress
spent only two years considering the draft rules. Professor
Weissenberger, however, goes farther and twice asserts that the
judiciary "dominated" the process. 28 Congress's role was essentially "passive,"2 9 "primarily" limited to "ratify[ingl" the evidentiary rules devised by the judiciary.30 Analogizing to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Professor Weissenberger writes that
although in a technical sense the process formally concluded
with congressional action, the "'[reality" is "'non-action by Congress'" constituting "'tacit approval." 3 1 Given these assumptions
about the respective roles of Congress and the judiciary, Professor Weissenberger believes there is no need for the courts to "defer[] to legislative supremacy" in interpreting the Federal
Rules."2 Professor Weissenberger expressly states that "the principle of separation of powers, which supports judicial deference
to the legislative branch, is misplaced in the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence." 3 This version of the historical process is
both oversimplified and inaccurate.
To begin with, the analogy to the experience with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is inapt in the extreme. In 1934, Congress approved the Rules Enabling Act authorizing the federal
judiciary to promulgate rules of court. 4 When the Supreme

28. See Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1547.
29. See i&.at 1548; see also id. at 1575-76 (describing the "wholly passive" role of
some state legislatures in the process of promulgating their jurisdictions' codes patterned after the Federal Rules).
30. Id. at 1547.
31. Id. at 1548 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
32. Id.; see id. at 1547, 1590.
33. Id. at 1548.
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of
the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 673 (1975).
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Court promulgated the Rules of Civil Procedure, the process proceeded uneventfully; Congress neither intervened to modify any
of the proposed rules nor even threatened to do so. 35 For that
matter, between 1934 and the time of the Court's submission of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, "Congress had never challenged
any rule approved by the Court." 6 As a practical matter, the
Court enjoyed an autonomous role in prescribing rules for federal judicial practice for forty years.3 1 "This situation changed dramatically," however, when the Court transmitted the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence to Congress. 3 8 Congress intervened for
the first time, precipitating a "crisis" in the relationship between
Congress and the Court in promulgating standards for the federal courts. 39 The congressional response to the earlier draft civil
court rules can be described accurately as "'non-action" conferring "'tacit approval" on the Court's draft, 40 but that description
is woefully inadequate to capture the intensity of the negative
congressional response to the draft Federal Rules of Evidence.
The stated reasons for the congressional.intervention are even
more significant than the fact of the intervention:
Even before the draft rules reached Congress, Justice Douglas placed separation of powers in issue. He dissented from
the Court's order transmitting the draft rules to Congress. He
did so on the ground that the promulgation of the rules exceeded the Court's authority. When the rules reached Congress, several members voiced their agreement with Justice
Douglas and opined that promulgation of the rules was properly a legislative function. House Judiciary Committee Report
No. 93-52 accompanied that chamber's bill blocking the implementation of the Federal Rules of Evidence by the Court.
The report specifically mentioned Justice Douglas's dissent.
More to the point, the report expressly cited "the constitutional separation of powers" doctrine as a reason for prevent-

35.
36.
37.
38.

See Friedenthal, supra note 34, at 674-75.
Id. at 675 n.18.
See id. at 675.
Id.

39. See id. at 673, 675.

40. See Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1548 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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ing "the promulgation of Rules of Evidence by the Supreme
Court." A similar bill was introduced in the Senate. The Senate legislation was entitled "[a] bill to promote the separation
of constitutional powers." Then Senator... Samuel Ervin
introduced the bill. The very first sentence of his remarks
referenced the separation of powers doctrine. 4 '
Again, Professor Weissenberger flatly asserts that "the principle
of separation of powers.., is misplaced in the context of the
Federal Rules of Evidence."4 2 Congress obviously disagreed. That
principle was a paramount concern when Congress decided to
take the unprecedented step of blocking the Court's draft and
insisting that the Rules take effect, if at all, as statutes rather
than rules promulgated under the Court's authority.
Professor Weissenberger is surely correct in stating that to
appreciate the Federal Rules, we must understand "the... climate at the time of the... origins of the Federal Rules of Evidence."43 Professor Weissenberger, however, overlooks the historical development that poisoned Congress's attitude toward the
draft Federal Rules, especially its proposal for a broad privilege
for government information:
[Clonsider when Congress intervened. Congress considered
the draft rules against the backdrop of the Watergate controversy. That controversy made Congress acutely "jealous of its
prerogatives vis-A-vis both the Executive and the Judiciary."
[The same] Congress [that blocked the promulgation of the
Federal Rules] was battling in federal court over evidentiary
doctrines, namely, President Nixon's privilege claims. The
[Supreme] Court handed down its privilege decision, United
States v. Nixon, in 1974 while the rules were still pending
before Congress. The congressional proceedings on the Federal Rules contain numerous references to the Watergate controversy and the related evidentiary privilege issues.4

41. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond 'Top Down" Grand Theories of Statu.
tory Construction: A 'Bottom Up" Interpretive Approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 OR. L. REV. 389, 414 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
42. Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1548.
43. Id. at 1556.
44. Imwinkelried, supra note 41, at 414-15 (footnotes omitted).
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Senator Ervin chaired the Senate hearings reviewing the draft
Federal Rules of Evidence as well as those investigating President Nixon.45 In this political climate, it is understandable that
Congress would be acutely conscious of asserting its area of hegemony.
When it intervened, Congress not only rewrote many provisions of the draft Federal Rules of Evidence; more fundamentally, it also revised the basic legislation authorizing the Court to
promulgate rules by tightening congressional control over the
process. To begin with, Congress amended the Rules Enabling
Act to ensure that it had ample time to review a draft evidence
rule before the rule took effect.' Revisiting the issue in 1988,
Congress amended the statute again to give it even more time to
scrutinize a draft evidence rule proposed by the Court.'
Congress went even farther in restricting the judiciary's power
to adopt court rules relating to evidentiary privileges. With respect to other evidentiary doctrines, Congress was content to
guarantee itself a substantial period of time in which to veto a
proposal submitted by the Court. When it came to privileges,
however, Congress decided to deprive the Court of any independent power to promulgate a court rule; Congress decreed that
"[a]ny... rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary
privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of
Congress. "48 In short, Congress not only changed specific provisions of the draft Federal Rules; Congress went to the length of
revamping the very procedure for promulgating future court
rules to enhance its role and diminish that of the judiciary.
Professor Weissenberger repeatedly insists that considerations
of legislative supremacy are largely irrelevant to the interpretation of the Federal Rules.49 The detailed historical record, however, bears out the contrary position taken by the late Professor
Cleary, the Reporter for the Advisory Committee that drafted
the Rules for the Judicial Conference. As Reporter, Professor
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id. at 415 n.271.
See id. at 416.
See id.
28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (1994).
See Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1547-48, 1590.
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Cleary was intimately familiar with the process of developing
the Rules; he was a key participant and helped shape the process. Looking back at the process in retrospect in 1978, Professor
Cleary observed that "[t]he most basic and fundamental assumption underlying the Rules is that of congressional supremacy.""
Like the history of the general process of promulgating the
Federal Rules, the history of individual rules lends support to
Professor Cleary's observation. At one point, Professor
Weissenberger approvingly cites Dean Mengler's analysis of habit evidence under Rule 406.51 Professor Weissenberger notes that
Dean Mengler crafts a persuasive argument that Rule 406 gives
"courts" discretion to evolve a definition of habit. In the course of
restating Dean Mengler's analysis, Professor Weissenberger
sometimes refers generally to "courts"5 2 and on other occasions
to "trial courts."5 3 The distinction between trial and appellate
courts is critical to understanding Dean Mengler's position. The
thrust of Dean Mengler's position is that Rule 406 illustrates a
legislative judgment that power should be shifted from appellate
courts to trial judges.' Based on his reading of the history of the
Federal Rules, Dean Mengler concludes that "appellate
rulemaking is entirely inconsistent with the" basic design of the
Rules.5 5 In Dean Mengler's words, Congress left "play in the
joints" of many Rules provisions to enable the trial judge to
situationally adapt the statutory mandate.5 6 However, he expressly rejects Professor Weissenberger's conclusion that the
drafters "left the task of' defining habit "to the [appellate]
courts."5 7 Quite to the contrary, Dean Mengler uses the history
of Rule 406 to support his conclusion that the members of the
Advisory Committee were "skeptic[al] about appellate [eviden-

50. Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57
NEB. L. REV. 908, 910 (1978).
51. See Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1584-86 (citing Thomas M. Mengler, The
Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413 (1989)).
52. Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1585-86.
53. See id. at 1585.
54. See Mengler, supra note 51, at 415.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 414.
57. Id. at 423.
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tiary] decisionmaking." 58 The 1961 Judicial Conference study,
which Professor Weissenberger mentions, 9 bears out Dean
Mengler's conclusion. That study recommended a uniform set of
court rules for federal evidence practice in part because the appellate courts had failed to produce a clear, coherent body of evidence law.60 The study found that despite decades of effort by
the federal appellate courts, on many vital issues the common
law of evidence was a "grotesque structure"6 1 troubled by "conflicting precedents."6 2
As Professor Weissenberger explains, if the Federal Rules
were intended to function as a perpetual index code, the appellate courts would enjoy roughly the same decisionmaking authority on evidentiary matters that they possessed at common
law. In light of the history of the Federal Rules, it is a grave
mistake to attribute that intent to either the Advisory Committee or Congress. As Dean Mengler demonstrates, the proceedings
of the Advisory Committee indicate that the committee members
had reached the conclusion that, in many respects, appellate
court development of evidence doctrine had failed. It is certainly
dubious to ascribe that intent to the Congress that enacted the
Federal Rules; that body was the Watergate Congress that was
predictably concerned with preserving its sphere of legislative
supremacy in the separation of powers scheme. In the legislation
blocking the Supreme Court's draft of the Federal Rules, the
pertinent committee reports, and individual statements of legislators, Congress repeatedly asserted that one of its motivations
for intervening was to safeguard that sphere. Professor
Weissenberger believes that "the principle of separation of powers ... is misplaced in the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "63 but Congress obviously viewed the Court's proposal in
the context of that very principle.

58. Id. at 424.

59. See Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1567.
60. See Comm=TEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENcE, A
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBIITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM RULES
OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRCT COURTS 25-26, 28, 51 (1962).

61. Id. at 27 (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948)).
62. Id. at 42.
63. Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1548.
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THE TEXT OF THE FEDERAL RULEs OF EVIDENCE
Professor Weissenberger does not rely exclusively on an historical argument; he also advances an alternative, textual argument for his position. Rule 102 provides the linchpin of this
textual argument. That rule reads: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined."" Professor
Weissenberger looks to Rule 102 as the basis of his contention
that the appellate courts still possess common-law authority to
expand on the list of exclusionary rules set out in the text of the
Federal Rules. 65 He forcefully declares that Rule 102 "commands" that the Federal Rules be treated as a perpetual index
code. 66 To his mind, the language of Rule 102 is so crystal clear
67
that "by its very nature," Rule 102 "trumps all other Rules"
and empowers the appellate courts to "disregard" the express
language of the other Rules. 61 His extended textual argument includes mention of Uniform Commercial Code section 1-103,69 the
Model Code of Evidence, 70 the original version of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 71 and the California Evidence Code.7' I submit that Professor Weissenberger has read too much into Rule
102 and that the other codes to which he alludes undermine his
position.
To begin with, every word of the text of Rule 102 can be given
effect without accepting the assumption of the continued authority of the appellate courts to expand upon the list of codified
exclusionary rules. In two passages, Professor Weissenberger
correctly remarks that Rule 102 identifies "values" or policies

64. FED. R. EVID. 102.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1552, 1565-67.
See id. at 1566.
Id. at 1581.
See id
See id. at 1581-82.
See id. at 1569-71.
See id.
See id. at 1554 n.59.
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that should inform the construction of the Federal Rules.73 The
first is "secur[ing] fairness in administration."74 Judges certainly
should consider that policy in exercising their discretionary control over the mode and order of examining witnesses under Rule
611(a). 75 The second value is the "elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay." 6 Judges ought to factor this policy into
their limited power to exclude evidence under Rule 403.7' The
final value enumerated in Rule 102 is the "promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."78 This

value also can be implemented without assuming that the appellate courts have independent authority to prescribe new
exclusionary rules. For example, the courts can accept new theories of noncharacter logical relevance for an accused's uncharged
misconduct under Rule 404(b).7 s Similarly, a court effectuates
this Rule 102 value under Rule 901(a), concerning authentication, by fashioning novel foundations for evidence generated by
recent technological breakthroughs such as facsimile,8 ° e-mail, 1
and caller identification. 82 The recognition of these new theories
and foundations represents "growth and development" in evidence law, and these theories certainly promote "the end that
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."83 In Professor Cleary's words, the courts can weigh these
values "in the exercise of [their] delegated powers" under the
express terms of the individual rules." Thus, there is a plausible
reading of Rule 102 that gives effect to every word in the rule

73. See id. at 1590-91.
74. FED. R. EvID. 102.
75. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
76. FED. R. EvID. 102.
77. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
78. FED. R. EvID. 102.
79. Rule 404(b) commits the federal courts to the inclusionary conception of the
uncharged misconduct doctrine. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDuCT EVIDENCE § 2:31 (rev. ed. 1998).
80. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 54-59 (4th ed. 1998).
81. See id. at 59-69.
82. See id. at 79-84.
83. FED. R. EVID. 102.
84. Cleary, supra note 50, at 915.
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without positing the continued existence of the common-law
power to engraft uncodified exclusionary rules.
The case for Professor Weissenberger's reading of Rule 102
becomes even weaker when one turns to the other codes to
which he alludes in the course of his argument. Consider, for
example, his analogy to UCC section 1-103. That statute reads:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent,
estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall
supplement its provisions.85
The Official Comment states that the section is intended to "indicate[] the continued applicability... of all supplemental bodies of law except insofar as they are explicitly displaced by this
Act." 6 There is a vast difference between the wording of Rule
102 and UCC section 1-103. Section 1-103 specifically announces
that other "principles of [common] law and equity" remain good
law, and the Official Comment confirms the plain meaning of
the text of section 1-103. In stark contrast, the text of Rule 102
is devoid of any mention of the common law. Similarly, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 102 contains no language comparable to the quoted passage in the Official Comment to UCC section 1-103.
Professor Weissenberger's reliance on Rule 102 is fundamentally flawed because it does not speak to the critical question.
Suppose that the question is whether a court may rely on the
common-law economic duress doctrine 7 to invalidate a contract
that otherwise complies with the UCC. The court would turn to
UCC section 1-103 because the text of the statute expressly
states that the court may consider "principles of [common] law"
that "invalidat[e]" contracts.8 8 Here, the corresponding issue is
whether an appellate court may draw on the common law to

85. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1995).
86. Id. § 1-103 cmt. 1.
87. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4.16-.19 (1990 & Supp. 1998).
88. U.C.C. § 1-103.
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enforce an uncodified exclusionary rule. By definition,
exclusionary rules are evidentiary doctrines that have the operative effect of barring the introduction of logically relevant evidence. The question becomes which sources of law may an appellate court rely upon as authority for excluding such evidence?
On its face, Rule 402-not Rule 102--directly addresses that
question. Rule 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."89
As Professor Weissenberger acknowledges," Professor Cleary
asserts that "[iun principle, under the Federal Rules no common
law of evidence remains."91 As authority for that proposition,
Professor Cleary cites Rule 40292 because he understands that
Rule 402 is apposite when the question presented is whether
appellate courts retain the power to enforce case or decisional
exclusionary rules to block the admission of relevant evidence.
Professor Cleary is not alone in that understanding. The drafters of the Vermont code acknowledged that understanding of the
impact of Rule 402 in their Note. That Note specifically states
that Rule 402 has the effect of eliminating prior decisional law. 93
In several other jurisdictions, including Oregon and West Virginia, the drafters decided as a matter of policy that their appellate
courts should retain their common-law authority; in order to
preserve that authority, the drafters amended the wording of
Rule 402. 94 Both the Reporter and all these drafting committees
therefore worked on the assumption that Rule 402 controlled.
The case for this interpretation of Rule 402 becomes even
stronger when one turns to the other evidentiary codes that Professor Weissenberger mentions. Two such codes are the Model
Code of Evidence and the original version of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence. In the same sentence, Professor Weissenberger
89. FED. R. EviD. 402.
90. Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1565.
91. Cleary, supra note 50, at 915.
92. See id. at 915 n.27.
93. See VT. R. EVID. 402 reporter's note.
94. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV. LmG. 129, 136 (1987).
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states both that the Advisory Committee "model[ed] the text of
the Federal Rules after the Model Code and the Uniform Rules"
and that the Rules were "not" intended as "a statutory displacement of preexisting evidentiary doctrines." 95 Professor
Weissenberger is correct in asserting that the Advisory Committee opted to follow the model of the Uniform Rules. For example,
the committee expressly cited Uniform Rule 7(f), but did so in its
Note to Rule 402, not Rule 102."6 The location of the citation
there is appropriate. Uniform Rule of Evidence 7 announced that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in these Rules ... all relevant
evidence is admissible."97 Kansas adopted the Uniform Rules
and, in commenting on Rule 7, the Kansas drafting committee
explained that "[t]his rule wipes out all existing restrictions...
on the admissibility of relevant evidence."" Model Code Rule 9
also provided that "[except as otherwise provided in the
Rules,... all relevant evidence is admissible."99 The official
comment to Rule 9 reads: "These Rules... abrogate the effect of
any prior judicial decision contrary to any part of any of the
Rules ..... 00 Admittedly, these codes provisions do not use Professor Weissenberger's preferred term, "displace" the common
law, but short of using that word, it is hard to imagine how the
drafters could have made their intent any more explicit. The
phrasing of these provisions is strikingly similar to that of Rule
402. The only distinction is linguistic; in the Model Code and
Uniform Rule, the exceptive language precedes the statutory
mandate that "all relevant evidence is admissible," while in Federal Rule 402 the exceptive language follows an identically
worded statutory mandate.
Finally, consider Professor Weissenberger's footnote discussion
of the California Evidence Code.10' In this footnote, he concedes

95. Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1570.
96. See FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee's note.

97. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5191, at 175 n.14 (1980).
98. Id. § 5192, at 178 n.9.
99. Id. § 5191, at 174-75 n.13.
100. MODEL CODE OF EVID. Rule 2 cmt., quoted in 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note

96, § 5199, at 219 n.1.
101. See Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1554 n.59.
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that that Code was intended to function as the "sole and authoritative'" source of exclusionary rules of evidence. 10 2 However, he
quickly adds that that "code... bears little resemblance to the
Federal Rules of Evidence."'03 The Advisory Committee thought
otherwise. California Evidence Code section 351 is the counterpart to Uniform Rule 7 and Model Code Rule 9. Section 351
states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible." 1' As previously stated, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 402 cites Uniform Rule 7 as one of
its models.0 5 In the same vein, the Note cites California Evidence Code section 351.
The Advisory Committee's discussion of the California Evidence Code deals a further blow to Professor Weissenberger's
position. He strenuously maintains that Rule 102 compels the
conclusion that the Federal Rules should be treated as a perpetual index code rather than a field comprehensive code. As previously stated, he concedes in a footnote that the California Evidence Code was intended to operate as a field comprehensive
code. 0 6 Interestingly enough, the Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 102 indicates that the committee used a provision of the
California Evidence Code-section 21 7 -- as a drafting model. The
Note characterizes section 2 as a "similar provisionO ."108 Obvi-

ously, even in Professor Weissenberger's mind, the inclusion of
section 2 in the California Evidence Code did not convert that
statutory scheme into a perpetual index code. If, as the Advisory
Committee tells us, Rule 102 is a "similar provision," it appears
fallacious to argue that standing alone, Rule 102 transforms the
Federal Rules into a perpetual index code.

102. Id. (quoting Pitchess v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 305, 311 (Cal. 1974)).
103. Id.
104. CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 351 (West 1995).
105. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
107. See CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 2 (stating that the "provisions" of the evidence
code "are to be liberally construed with a view to effecting its objects and promoting

justice").
108. FED. R. EVID. 102 advisory committee's note.
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CONCLUSION

Early in his article, Professor Weissenberger suggests that the
federal appellate courts have "inherent judicial powers" 10 9 to formulate their own evidentiary rules and that Congress's prescription of evidentiary rules may unconstitutionally "encroach upon
the judiciary's fundamental Article III powers."1 10 Professor
Weissenberger needs to elaborate this suggestion into a fullblown argument. That argument may have merit. On occasion,
state courts have invoked the separation of powers doctrine to
invalidate legislatively-prescribed evidentiary rules."' I am not a
constitutional law scholar, and I would not presume to make
any confident forecast of the prospect for that argument's success. Professor Weissenberger needs to amplify that constitutional argument, though, because his interpretive argument fails.
His version of the "history" of the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence is both incomplete and inaccurate. Further, while
reading too much into the text of Rule 102, he slights Rule 402
and ignores the instructive examples of Uniform Rule 7, Model
Code Rule 9, and California Evidence Code section 351. Although he accuses other commentators of myopia, his argument
suffers from a more serious malady-blindness to the details of
the history and text of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
At one point Professor Weissenberger asks: "What is at stake
in this debate?" 1 Simply stated, the stake is the future of evidence law. The United States still has "the most complex, restrictive set of evidentiary rules in the world."11 Our appellate
courts have multiplied exclusionary rules to a greater extent
than any other nation's judiciary, including the judicial systems
in other countries that utilize lay jurors. The enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence was a step in the right direction to-

109. Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1549.
110. Id. at 1550.
111. See, e.g., Day v. State, 643 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a
partial statutory abolition of the character evidence prohibition was "a nullity since
it conflicts with the common law rules of evidence").
112. Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1552.
113. RONALD I CARLSON ET AL, EVMENCE INTHE NNETIES: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 3 (3d ed. 1991).
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ward the rational simplification of American evidence law. Conceived as a field comprehensive code, the Federal Rules sweep
away many uncodified limitations on the introduction of logically
relevant evidence and disable the appellate courts from enforcing categorical exclusionary rules that cannot be grounded in the
statutory text of the Rules. If the judiciary decides that we need
to add a new categorical doctrine to the already long list of
exclusionary rules enforceable in federal practice, the judiciary
cannot implement that decision by a single appellate opinion;
rather, the judiciary must proceed in a more deliberate fashion
to promulgate a court rule embodying the new doctrine. As Rule
102 reflects, we should be concerned that "the law of evidence"
be structured "to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined."" Given those end objectives, the
"growth and development of the law of evidence""' do not equate
with the proliferation of exclusionary rules barring the admission of indisputably relevant evidence. Especially given the monumental effort expended in promulgating the Federal Rules, it
would be a tragedy to take a step backward now. We may do
precisely that, however, if we blind ourselves to the details of
the history of the Federal Rules and their text, especially the
language of Rule 402.

114. FED. R. EvID. 102.
115. Id.

